Conic Finance
A $3M loss on Ethereum in 2023, caused by a reentrancy flaw. Here's what happened, the vulnerability class behind it, and where it stands in ProveWall's re-proof pipeline.
| Loss | $3M |
| Year | 2023 |
| Chain | Ethereum |
| Vulnerability class | Reentrancy |
| Mechanism | read-only reentrancy |
◷ In the ProveWall re-proof queue
We have not yet re-executed this exploit on a forked chain. When we do, this page will show a signed, independently replayable receipt — the exploit moving value, and the patched control resisting. Until then this is a factual incident summary, not a proof. No proof, no finding.What this class of bug is
Reentrancy lets a malicious callback re-enter a function before its state is settled, enabling repeated withdrawals or double-spends against the same balance.
How to read this page. The dollar figure is the publicly reported loss attributed to this
incident. A ProveWall re-proof reproduces the vulnerability class/mechanism by execution on a forked chain,
with a signed receipt — we say so explicitly only once that execution has passed.
Other reentrancy exploits
Same vulnerability class, re-proven or queued on the wall: Cream Finance · Fei/Rari Fuse · Curve / Vyper reentrancy · The DAO
Want your own contract actually proven — not guessed?
Static tools and LLM auditors ask "is there a check here?" and miss the check that exists but is wrong. OmniGuard Labs runs the exploit on a forked chain and sends you a signed pass/fail receipt. Request a proof-backed audit →